China Recalibrates Military Outreach, Strengthening Officer Training for Africa and Arab States

Following the Gaza War, China, through the leadership of the Central Military Commission “CMC” and the National Defense University of the People’s Liberation Army “PLAU”) in Beijing, intensified its use of military diplomacy and professional training for Arab and African military elites. This was achieved through a strategy of employing professional military education for officers, soldiers, and ranks of African and Arab military and security leadership. The aim was to later assist graduates in assuming high-ranking military leadership positions in their respective countries. This facilitated “strategic understanding” with Beijing through a number of military elites who pledged allegiance to Beijing, in contrast to the long-standing military allegiance to the United States. Furthermore, it aimed to position China as a strategic alternative and a provider of security and stability in the Horn of Africa, the Middle East, the Gulf region, and the Arab world. The objective was to shape the loyalties of future military elites to counter the role of “military policeman” that the United States had played for many years in ensuring the loyalty of a number of African, Arab, and Gulf military and security leaders to Washington, at the expense of Beijing’s military and security interests.

  To this end, the Chinese Central Military Commission (CMC) and the People’s Liberation Army National Defense University (PLAU) have been employing professional military education for officers, soldiers, and leadership ranks in African and Arab military and security forces, as well as supporting military leaders in developing countries of the Global South. This serves as a strategic tool for China to deepen its influence and build long-term ties with military elites in the Horn of Africa and the Middle East, particularly in light of the geopolitical shifts following the Gaza War. To this end, the CMC and the PLAU are working to promote and strengthen “military diplomacy” in the Middle East, the Gaza Strip, and the Horn of Africa, under the leadership of Chinese President Xi Jinping, as an alternative to the role of the United States as the military policeman by 2026.  The actions and meetings of the Chinese military leadership council (Central Military Commission), headed by President Xi Jinping, regarding the crises in the Middle East and the Horn of Africa are characterized by a focus on “common global security and developmental mediation” and “avoiding direct military involvement,” while simultaneously strengthening China’s strategic presence in key locations. As for the most prominent developments and declared directions of the (Central Military Commission and the National Defense University of the People’s Liberation Army) up to the beginning of 2026, they can be summarized, as follows: (China’s position on the Gaza war and the Middle East), through China’s call for an international peace conference, as emphasized by President Xi Jinping in his capacity as Chairman of the Central Military Commission in Beijing on several occasions, including the China-Arab Cooperation Forum. He stressed the necessity of holding a “comprehensive and credible” international peace conference to end the suffering in Gaza and implement the two-state solution.  In addition to sponsoring reconciliation agreements between various Palestinian factions in Beijing, China also sponsored the “Beijing Declaration” in July 2024 to end the division among Palestinian factions. This move reflects the Chinese leadership’s desire to play the role of “honest broker” as an alternative to American influence in the region. The Chinese military leadership rejects regional escalation and the expansion of the conflict to Lebanon, Iran, or elsewhere and consistently calls, through the United Nations, for an immediate ceasefire and an end to the “collective punishment” of civilians.

 The most important and prominent features of the strategy of the Chinese Central Military Commission and the People’s Liberation Army National Defense University in employing professional military education for officers, soldiers, and ranks of African and Arab military and security leadership, and in supporting military leaders in the Global South, especially after the Gaza War and its repercussions, can be summarized as follows: using military education as a tool of hard “soft power” and building Arab and African military elites. Through its Professional Military Education (PME) programs, China aims to train thousands of officers from Africa and the Middle East annually in its academies, such as the People’s Liberation Army National Defense University. Graduates subsequently occupy high-ranking leadership positions in their countries, thus facilitating “strategic understanding” with Beijing.

 Perhaps the most striking aspect of the “Professional Military Education” (PME) strategy in the Middle East, the Arab states, and the Horn of Africa is the export of the Chinese model of governance, which links the military with party and political activity. The “political-military model” is integrated into educational curricula, promoting the Chinese leadership model that connects the military and the party and offering an alternative to Western models. The Chinese “Professional Military Education” strategy in Africa also aims to strengthen ties in the Horn of Africa and transform Djibouti’s role. The Djibouti base is no longer merely a Chinese logistics hub but has become a launching point for enhancing regional Chinese military partnerships and joint exercises.

 To bolster the success of the Chinese “Professional Military Education strategy”, China has launched several security initiatives. Beijing introduced the “Peaceful Development in the Horn of Africa” ​​initiative and appointed a special envoy, focusing on providing military assistance and training as part of a broader strategy to contain American influence in the region.

 China has also succeeded, through its strategy of professional military education, in expanding its influence in the Middle East (post-Gaza War) and exploiting the gap with the United States and the West. China leveraged its support for an immediate ceasefire in Gaza to bolster its image as a “fair and neutral partner” compared to the United States, thus increasing the appeal of military and educational cooperation with it among Arab and regional elites. Furthermore, China has benefited from this strategy of professional military education in shifting its focus from economics to security, particularly in the Middle East. While China’s influence in the Middle East remains primarily economic, it has begun to intensify joint naval exercises, such as those with Iran and Russia, and expand its exports of military technology and leadership training.  Herein lies the most prominent strategic objective of the Chinese Central Military Commission (CMC) and its Professional Military Education (PME) strategy:

(Operational familiarization with the military work environment in the Middle East and Africa). These programs enable the Chinese military to understand the complex combat environments in the region and learn from the experiences of local armies. Furthermore (securing Chinese interests), these educational ties aim to protect investments in China’s Belt and Road Initiative and ensure the security of maritime trade routes through the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean. Through its Professional Military Education strategy, China presents itself as an alternative military option for the Middle East, the Gulf States, and Africa. Beijing offers itself as an “unconditional” political educational and military option, granting countries in the region greater flexibility in balancing their relations with major powers.

 Regarding the Central Military Commission’s vision in Beijing for the Horn of Africa and Red Sea security, it considers the Djibouti Strategic Base to be the People’s Liberation Army’s support base in Djibouti and the central hub for Chinese operations in the Horn of Africa, a region sensitive to Chinese interests. This base is used to secure Chinese commercial vessels and monitor vital waterways such as the Bab el-Mandeb Strait and the Gulf of Aden. The Central Military Commission relies on this base to secure these waterways, especially in light of attacks in the Red Sea. China adopts a policy of “maintaining the safety of international shipping” without joining military alliances led by Washington, preferring instead to use diplomatic channels with regional actors, such as Iran, to secure its interests.  As for the most prominent features of Chinese military diplomacy in the Middle East and Gaza Strip in 2026, they are represented by a number of Chinese initiatives and strategies in the region, such as the Second China-Arab Summit 2026, which Beijing considers the main driver for deepening strategic and security trust between China and its partners in the region. Furthermore, and most importantly for political, intelligence, security, military, intellectual, and analytical circles in China, there is a focus on the role of the “Global Security Initiative” (GSI).

 China presents itself as a diplomatic and security alternative by calling for broad international peace conferences to resolve the crisis in Gaza, emphasizing the implementation of the two-state solution and rejecting forced displacement. This is achieved through the promotion of the Global Security Initiative, proposed by Chinese President “Xi Jinping”, to resolve all outstanding crises in the region.

 The Central Military Commission in Beijing has also developed several military strategies and plans to expand military cooperation to serve its interests in the Middle East and around the world, especially with the continuation of joint Chinese naval exercises, such as the “China Belt of Security” military exercises in 2025/2026 with Iran and Russia, and the increasing sales of military technology, such as the Chinese drone technology known militarily as the (TB-001) to Morocco and other countries in the region.

 As for the Chinese Central Military Commission’s vision for the Horn of Africa, a region of vital importance to both Chinese interests and the African continent, it is embodied in a “peace and development vision.” China is leading mediation efforts through its special envoy to the Horn of Africa and has declared the “2026 Year of China-Africa People-to-People Exchanges” to strengthen non-traditional security ties.  Furthermore, China and its Central Military Commission have adopted the Professional Military Education (PME) strategy.

 Through this strategy, China aims to train 6,000 high-ranking African officers and 1,000 law enforcement personnel by 2027, strengthening ties with regional military elites. This is in addition to bolstering the Chinese presence in Djibouti, where the role of the Djibouti base is evolving from mere logistical support for peacekeeping operations to a center for securing strategic interests in the Bab El-Mandeb Strait.

  On the other hand, China’s policies and strategies in the Middle East and Africa present numerous challenges and anticipated outcomes. Despite Beijing’s efforts to offer a security model “without political conditions,” its military diplomacy faces several challenges, including maintaining neutrality between competing powers, such as the tensions between Israel and Iran, and avoiding the direct military involvement that characterized the American role. Instead, China focuses on “bridging the security gap” through investments in defense infrastructure and cybersecurity in countries across the Middle East, the Horn of Africa, and elsewhere.

 To this end, the Chinese Central Military Commission launched the “Development of the Horn of Africa” ​​initiative. Meetings between the Chinese Central Military Commission and leaders in the Horn of Africa, particularly Sudan and Ethiopia, have emphasized linking security with economic development, asserting that addressing the root causes of conflicts requires infrastructure investment.

  Accordingly, we can understand the strategic directions of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) in the period 2025-2026, focusing on the “balance of power.” While the Central Military Commission in Beijing concentrates most of its direct military efforts on the Taiwan region and the South China Sea, it has strengthened “military diplomacy” in the Middle East through high-level visits to deepen security cooperation with countries such as Saudi Arabia and the UAE. This is also reflected in China’s 15th Five-Year Plan (2026-2030), whereby China aims to align its development plans with the national visions of countries in the region, focusing on cybersecurity, artificial intelligence, and energy as tools to enhance its strategic influence without resorting to traditional military intervention.

  Based on the preceding analysis, we understand the role of the Chinese Central Military Commission in preferring the role of “political and economic guarantor” in the Middle East, the Horn of Africa, and the Red Sea areas sensitive to Chinese interests rather than playing the role of “American military policeman.” The Chinese Central Military Commission seeks to capitalize on American preoccupation with crises to enhance its image as a power striving for global stability.